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Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to greatly improve the delivery of healthcare and
other services that advance population health and wellbeing. However, the use of AI in
healthcare also brings potential risks that may cause unintended harm. To guide future
developments in AI, the High-Level Expert Group on AI set up by the European Commission
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(EC), recently published ethics guidelines for what it terms “trustworthy” AI. These guidelines
are aimed at a variety of stakeholders, especially guiding practitioners toward more ethical
andmore robust applications of AI. In line with efforts of the EC, AI ethics scholarship focuses
increasingly on converting abstract principles into actionable recommendations. However,
the interpretation, relevance, and implementation of trustworthy AI depend on the domain
and the context in which the AI system is used. The main contribution of this paper is to
demonstrate how to use the general AI HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines in practice in the
healthcare domain. To this end, we present a best practice of assessing the use of machine
learning as a supportive tool to recognize cardiac arrest in emergency calls. The AI system
under assessment is currently in use in the city of Copenhagen in Denmark. The assessment
is accomplished by an independent team composed of philosophers, policy makers, social
scientists, technical, legal, and medical experts. By leveraging an interdisciplinary team, we
aim to expose the complex trade-offs and the necessity for such thorough human review
when tackling socio-technical applications of AI in healthcare. For the assessment, we use a
process to assess trustworthy AI, called 1Z-Inspection
®
to identify specific challenges and
potential ethical trade-offs when we consider AI in practice.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, cardiac arrest, case study, ethical trade-off, explainable AI, healthcare, trust,
trustworthy AI
INTRODUCTION
According to a recent literature review (Bærøe et al., 2020),
Artificial Intelligence (AI) in healthcare is already being used: 1) in
the assessment of the risk of disease onset and in estimating treatment
success (before initiation); 2) in an attempt to manage or alleviate
complications; 3) to assist with patient care during the active treatment
or procedure phase; 4) in research aimed at elucidating the pathology
or mechanism of and/or the ideal treatment for a disease.
For all of its potential, the use of AI in healthcare also brings
major risks and potential unintended harm. Warning examples have
shown that if ethical and social implications are disregarded, AI can
inflict significant harm on the people it is intended to benefit
(Obermeyer et al., 2019; Wiens et al., 2019; Gerke et al., 2020a;
Gerke et al., 2020b; Grote and Berens, 2020; Larrazabal et al., 2020).
While there are some first uses of AI in healthcare, there is still
a lack of many approved and validated products. Indeed, given
that “the artificial intelligence industry is driven by strong
economic and political interests,” the need for trustworthy
adoption of AI in healthcare is crucial (Bærøe et al., 2020).
AI has the potential to “greatly improve the delivery of
healthcare and other services that advance well-being, if it is
validated by the authorities, accepted and supported by the
Healthcare Professionals and Healthcare Organizations and
trusted by patients” (MedTech Europe, 2019; Deloitte, 2020).
TRUSTWORTHY AI
In line with efforts of the European Commission (EC), AI ethics
scholarship focuses increasingly on converting abstract principles
into actionable recommendations (Kredo et al., 2016). However,
the interpretation, relevance, and implementation of trustworthy
AI depend on the domain and the context where the AI system is
used. In order to bring some clarity and define a general framework for
the use of AI Systems, the High-Level Expert Group on AI (AI HLEG),
set up by the EC, published ethics guidelines for trustworthyAI inApril
2019 (AI HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines) (AI HLEG, 2019). These
guidelines are aimed at a variety of stakeholders, especially guiding
practitioners toward more ethical and more robust applications of AI2.
According to AI HLEG, an AI to be trustworthy needs to be:
lawful—respecting all applicable laws and regulations,
robust—both from a technical and social perspective, and
ethical—respecting ethical principles and values.
The AI HLEG defines four ethical principles rooted on
fundamental rights (AI HLEG, 2019): 1) respect for human
autonomy, 2) prevention of harm, 3) fairness, and 4) explicability.
Based on these four principles, the AI HLEG sets out seven
requirements for AI systems to be deemed trustworthy and which
assist the process of self-assessment. Each requirement is
described below (AI HLEG, 2019)3:
• Human agency and oversight: all potential impacts that AI
systems may have on fundamental rights should be
1Z-Inspection® is a registered trademark.
2Another relevant document at EU level is the European Group on Ethics in
Science and New Technologies (EGE) at the European Commission, Statement on
AI, Robotics and “Autonomous Systems,” Brussels, March 2018 https://ec.europa.
eu/research/ege/pdf/ege_ai_statement_2018.pdf
3In the EGE document, the ethical principles proposed are: 1. Human Dignity
(meaningful human control and awareness with the interaction with humans or
machines); 2. Autonomy; 3. Responsibility; 4. Justice, Equity and Solidarity; 5.
Democracy; 6. Rule of law and Accountability; 7. Security and Safety; 8. Data
protection and Privacy; 9. Sustainability.
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accounted for and that the human role in the decision-
making process is protected.
• Technical robustness and safety: AI systems should be
secure and resilient in their operation in a way that
minimizes potential harm, optimizes accuracy, and
fosters confidence in their reliability;
• Privacy and data governance: given the vast quantities of
data processed by AI systems, this principle impresses the
importance of protecting the privacy, integrity, and
quality of the data and protects human rights of access
to it;
• Transparency: AI systems need to be understandable at a
human level so that decisions made through AI can be
traced back to their underlying data. If a decision cannot be
explained it cannot easily be justified;
• Diversity, non-discrimination, and fairness: AI systems
need to be inclusive and non-biased in their application.
This is challenging when the data is not reflective of all the
potential stakeholders of an AI system;
• Societal and environmental wellbeing: in acknowledging
the potential power of AI systems, this principle emphasizes
the need for wider social concerns, including the
environment, democracy, and individuals to be taken
into account; and
• Accountability: this principle, rooted in fairness, seeks to
ensure clear lines of responsibility and accountability for
the outcomes of AI systems, mechanisms for addressing
trade-offs, and an environment in which concerns can be
raised.
However, the interpretation, relevance, and implementation of
trustworthy AI depends on the domain and the context where the
AI system is used.
Challenges and Limitations
Although these requirements are a welcome first step toward
enabling an assessment of the societal implication of the use of AI
systems, there are some challenges in the practical application of
requirements, namely:
- The AI HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines are not contextualized
by the domain they are involved in. The meaning of some of the
seven requirements is not anchored to the context (e.g., fairness,
wellbeing, etc.).
- They mainly offer a static checklist (AI HLEG, 2020) and do not
take into account changes of the AI over time.
- They do not distinguish different applicability of the AI HLEG
trustworthy AI guidelines (e.g., during design vs. after
production) as well as different stages of algorithmic
development, starting from business and use-case
development, design phase, training data procurement,
building, testing, deployment, and monitoring (Morley et al.,
2019).
- There are not available best practices to show how to implement
such requirements and apply them in practice.
- The AI HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines do not explicitly
address the lawful part of the assessment.
To help overcome some of these shortcomings, we created a
holistic process to guide a trustworthy AI assessment. We present
a case study to illustrate how it applies to a specific healthcare
context.
Assessing Trustworthy AI in Healthcare
The paper’s main contribution is to demonstrate how to use the
general AI HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines in practice for the
domain of healthcare. To this end, we present a best practice of
assessing the use of machine learning (ML) as a supportive tool to
recognize cardiac arrest in emergency calls. The AI system under
investigation has been used in the city of Copenhagen in
Denmark since Fall 2020.
We use a process to assess trustworthy AI in practice, called
Z-Inspection® (Zicari et al., 2021), which expands upon the
“Framework for Trustworthy AI” as defined by the AI HLEG.
The Z-Inspection® is a holistic process based on the method of
evaluating new technologies according to which ethical issues
must be discussed through the elaboration of socio-technical
scenarios. Echoing work in pragmatist ethics (Keulartz et al.,
2002; Lucivero, 2016), this methodology makes it possible to
implement the principles and requirements as defined in the AI
HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines, while ensuring a satisfactory
consideration of the specific issues of the cases studied. Socio-
technical scenarios prove to be a particularly effective means of
eliciting the reflections necessary to achieve the aims of the
Z-Inspection®.
The Z-Inspection® process, in a nutshell, is depicted in
Figure 1, and it is composed of three main phases: 1) the Set
Up Phase, 2) the Assess Phase, and 3) the Resolve Phase.
Our approach is inspired by both theory and practice
(“learning by doing”).
The work on Z-Inspection® started in late 2018. We have
developed and tested the Z-Inspection® process by evaluating a
non-invasive AI medical device designed to assist medical doctors
in the diagnosis of cardiovascular diseases. The system we
assessed was an AI medical device, [certified in Europe as CE
class 1 according to the European Commission Medical Device
Directives (MDD) (European Parliament and Council of
European Union, 1993)] using machine learning to analyze
sensor data (i.e., electrical signals of the heart) of patients to
predict the risk of cardiovascular heart disease. Our team
included ethicists, AI engineers, legal experts, medical doctors,
and other domain experts.
The detailed process is described in (Zicari et al., 2021). Here
we recall some of the key elements of the process. The
Z-Inspection® is a general process to assess trustworthy AI in
practice that can be used for a variety of domains where an AI
system is under development and/or deployed. Here we focus on
the healthcare domain, as it is pertinent to the use case that we are
reporting in this paper.
The Set-Up Phase
The Set-Up phase starts by verifying that no conflict of interest
exists, both direct and indirect, between independent experts and
the primary stakeholders of the use case. This phase continues by
creating a multi-disciplinary assessment team composed of a
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diverse range of experts. For this use case, the team included:
philosophers, healthcare ethicists, healthcare domain experts
(such as cardiologists, and other clinicians, cardiovascular and
public health researchers), legal researchers, social scientists, AI
engineers, and patient representatives. This is one of the most
important aspects of our approach to ensure that a variety of
viewpoints are expressed when assessing the trustworthiness of
an AI system. The set-up phase also includes the definition of the
boundaries of the assessment, taking into account that we do not
assess the AI system in isolation but rather consider the social-
technical interconnection with the ecosystem(s) where the AI is
developed and/or deployed.
The Assess Phase
The Assess Phase is composed of four tasks:
I. The creation and analysis of Socio-Technical Scenarios for
the AI system under assessment.
II. A list of ethical, technical, and legal “issues” is identified and
described using an open vocabulary.
III. To reach consolidation, such “issues” are then mapped to
some of the four ethical principles and the seven
requirements defined in the EU framework for
trustworthy AI.
IV. Execution of verification of claims is performed. A number of
iterations of the four tasks may be necessary in order to arrive
to a final consolidated rubrics of issues mapped into the
trustworthy AI framework.
The Resolve Phase
In a nutshell, the resolve phase consists of giving
recommendations to key stakeholders. It is crucial to monitor
that the AI system that fulfilled the Trustworthy AI requirement
at launch continues to do so over time. Therefore, when required,
the resolve phase includes conducting a trustworthy monitoring
over time of the AI system (we call it “ethical maintenance”). In
Düdder et al. (2020), we have defined an AI ethical maintenance
process based on an adapted version of the Reliability-Centered
Maintenance (RCM) model (Moubray, 2001).
Using the process, we can identify possible ethical, as well as
technical issues, of use of this AI system. In the rest of this paper,
we report the results of the various tasks of the Z-Inspection®
process applied to the specific use case presented below.
This paper is a first reflection of what we are learning by
assessing this case. The assessment is ongoing. The final results of
the assessment will be published in a follow up paper.
ASSESSING TRUSTWORTHY AI—BEST
PRACTICE: MACHINE LEARNING AS A
SUPPORTIVE TOOL TO RECOGNIZE
CARDIAC ARREST IN EMERGENCY CALLS
The problem: Health-related emergency calls (112) are part of the
Emergency Medical Dispatch Center (EMS) of the City of
Copenhagen, triaged by medical dispatchers (i.e., medically
trained dispatchers who answer the call, e.g., nurses and
paramedics) and medical control by a physician on-site
(Lippert, 2018).
In the last years, the Emergency Medical Dispatch Center of
the City of Copenhagen has failed to identify approximately 25%
of cases of out-of-hospital cardiac arrest (OHCA), the last quarter
has only been recognized once the paramedics/ambulance arrives
at the scene (Viereck et al., 2017; Blomberg et al., 2019; Drennan
et al., 2021). Therefore, the Emergency Medical Dispatch Center
of the City of Copenhagen loses the opportunity to provide the
caller with instructions for cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR),
FIGURE 1 | The Z-Inspection® process in a nutshell [with permission from (Zicari et al., 2021)].
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and hence, impair survival rates. OHCA is a life-threatening
condition that needs to be recognized rapidly by dispatchers, and
recognition of OHCA by either a bystander or a dispatcher in the
emergency medical dispatch center is a prerequisite for initiation
of CPR.
A Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) as defined by
(Perkins et al., 2015) consists of compressions on the upper
body to mechanically keep the blood flowing after the heart
has stopped beating.
Previous research has identified barriers to the recognition of
OHCA (Sasson et al., 2010; Møller et al., 2016; Viereck et al.,
2017). Improving early recognition is a goal for both the
American Heart Association and the Global Resuscitation
Alliance (Callaway et al., 2015; Eisenberg et al., 2018;
Nadarajan et al., 2018).
The AI solution: A team lead by Stig Nikolaj Blomberg
(Emergency Medical Services Copenhagen, and Department of
Clinical Medicine, University of Copenhagen, Denmark) worked
together with a start-up company and examined whether a
machine learning (ML) framework could be used to recognize
out-of-hospital cardiac arrest (OHCA) by listening to the calls
made to the Emergency Medical Dispatch Center of the City of
Copenhagen. The company designed and implemented the AI
system and trained and tested it by using the archive of audio files
of emergency calls provided by Emergency Medical Services
Copenhagen in the year 2014. The prime aim of this AI
system is to assist medical dispatchers when answering 112
emergency calls to help them to early detect OHCA during
the calls, and therefore possibly saving lives.
Status: The AI system was put into production during
Fall 2020.
The research questions: Is the AI system trustworthy? Is the use
of this AI system trustworthy?
Motivation
This is a self-assessment conducted jointly by a team of
independent experts together with the prime stakeholder of
this use case. The main motivation of this work is to study if
the rate of lives saved could be increased by using AI, and at the
same time to identify how trustworthy is the use of the AI system
assessed here, and to provide recommendations to key
stakeholders.
The Set Up
To perform the assessment, an initial team of interdisciplinary4
experts was formed. The composition of the team is a dynamic
process and the choice of the experts, their skills, background, and
roles have a significant ethical implication for the overall process.
In our opinion, one cornerstone of being able to conduct an
independent AI ethical assessment is the absence of conflict of
interests,5 both direct and indirect. If conflicts of interests are
revealed in the course of the inspection, they are recorded and
shared with whatever entities solicited the inspection in the
interest of transparency and integrity.
Next, we defined the boundaries and the context of the
assessment. In our assessment process, an AI system is never
analyzed in isolation but always taking into account what we call
the “ecosystems.”
We define an ecosystem, as applied to our work, as a set of
sectors and parts of society, level of social organization, and
stakeholders within a political and economic context where the
AI is playing a role (Whittlestone et al., 2019).
The Assess Phase
The Assess Phase is composed of four tasks: I. The analysis of the
usage of the AI system. II. The identification of possible ethical
issues, as well as technical and legal issues. III. Mapping of such
issues to the trustworthy AI ethical values and requirements. IV.
The verification of such requirements.
The basic idea is 1) to identify a list of ethical and other issues
(called flags) which require inspection, then 2) map them to some
or all of the seven requirements for trustworthy AI, and from this
mapping, 3) create a plan of investigation that will provide
feedback to re-evaluate the initial list of ethical issues and flags
to produce a consolidated list.
We can visualize this part of the process as follows: the first
part, 1) leaves space for the experts to explore and identify
possible “issues” using an open vocabulary. They describe
ethical issues and flags with their own words and bring in
their own expertize and different background and viewpoints.
The second part, 2) the mapping, forces the discussion to reach a
consensus by using a closed vocabulary, i.e., the four ethical
principles and the seven requirements for trustworthy AI. The
third part, 3) depends on the status of the assessment. For post
deployment, it helps verify claims (if any), or as a tool to support
the design of the AI system.
This phase was undertaken by a general group of 30
participants proficient in technical and theoretical computer
science, ethics, law, social science, and medical expertize
specific to the particular use case. General meetings, reflecting
the iterative structure of the Assess Phase, were envisioned via a
tripartite structure: the first for the primary stakeholders of the
original use case to motivate and present their work, the second
for Z-Inspection® participants to ask substantive and critical
questions of the primary stakeholders, and the third for
participants to map these questions to the ethical categories in
4To describe inclusion of different scientific disciplines in the same project, various
terms exist, such as multidisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and interdisciplinary
(Frodeman et al., 2012; Budtz Pedersen et al., 2015). Our approach is most
accurately described as “interdisciplinary” since the research is developed in
between disciplines about a research question formulated from within the
research group.
5What exactly are conflicts of interest?While it is hard to find a universal definition,
a common denominator is that conflicts of interest arise when personal interests
interfere with requirements of institutional roles or professional responsibilities
(Komesaroff et al., 2019). Here, interests can be seen as goals that are aligned with
certain financial or non-financial values that have a particular, possibly detrimental
effect on decision-making. Coexistence of conflicting interests results in
incompatibility of two or more lines of actions. In modern research settings,
dynamic and complex constellations of conflicting interests frequently occur
(Hagendorff and Meding, 2020).
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the EU’s Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. Following this mapping,
the general group splintered into more specialized subgroups to
continue the Z-inspection.
In this paper, we will cover tasks I, II and III. We plan to
publish the results of task IV in a forthcoming paper.
THE ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE OF THE AI
SYSTEM
The Assess Phase of the process begins with the analysis of socio-
technical scenarios.
Scenarios of Use
In order to answer the above research questions, we created
scenarios of use for this AI system and discussed them in several
workshops with the experts together with the prime stakeholder.
We report the essential parts in this section.
The basic idea is to analyze the AI system using socio-technical
scenarios with relevant stakeholders, including domain, technical,
legal, and ethics experts (Leikas et al., 2019). For this case, we
decided not to include the vendor company who designed and
implemented the AI system in the analysis, due to possible
conflict of interests.
Socio-technical scenarios or usage scenarios are a useful tool to
describe the aim of the system, the actors, their expectations, the
goals of actors’ actions, the technology, and the context (Leikas
et al., 2019). Socio-technical scenarios can also be used to broaden
stakeholder understanding of one’s own role in understanding
technology, as well as awareness of stakeholder interdependence.
Scenarios can be used as a part of the assessment of an AI system
already deployed (as in this case), or as a participatory design tool
if the AI is in the design phase.
Our team of experts used socio-technical scenarios to be
able to identify a list of potential ethical and, technical and
legal issues that needed to be further deliberated. For that, we
used discussion workshops, where expert groups worked
together to systematically examine, and elaborate the
various tasks with respect to different contexts of the AI.
We then distributed the work to smaller working groups to
continue the analysis. We present in the rest of this section a
summary of the socio-technical scenarios that we have
created for this use case.
Aim of the ML System
We started by analyzing the prime aim of this AI system, namely
to assist medical dispatchers (also referred to as call takers) when
answering 112 emergency calls to help them to early detect
OHCA during the calls, and increase the potential for saving lives.
The system has been implemented because OHCA can be
difficult for call takers to identify, possibly due to static, language
barriers, unclear descriptions by callers, and misunderstandings,
along with limited attention spans in calls.
For OHCA, a specific problem (compared with other 112 calls)
is that the caller is never the patient—as they are unresponsive at
that time of the call (Safar, 1988)—but a bystander (i.e., spouse or
passer-by).
Identification of Actors
For this use case, we identified three classes of actors: primary,
secondary, and tertiary.
We define primary actors as stakeholders in direct contact with
the applied system.
The primary actors are Stig Nikolaj and his team (who
specified the requirements for the design of the AI system and
supplied the training and test data) are the prime stakeholder of
the use case; the patients; the patients’ family members, the
callers/bystanders; paramedics and the medically trained
dispatchers who answer the call.
Secondary actors are stakeholders responsible for developing
and implementing the system but not using it directly.
The secondary actors are: the AI vendor, a start-up company,
independent from the owner of the case who designed,
implemented, and deployed the AI system. The CEO of the
Emergency Medical Services who gave permission to put the
system into deployment.
Tertiary actors are part of the overall ecosystem where the AI
system is used.
The tertiary actors are the Copenhagen Emergency Medical
Services (EMS), which is an integrated part of the Health Care
System for the Capital Region of Denmark, consisting of one
hospital trust with six university hospitals in nine locations and
one emergency medical service (Lippert, 2018).
Actors Expectations and Motivations
The actors listed above share one common goal: saving the
patient’s life. Aside from this goal, the actors have some
distinct expectations and motivations:
- Caller/bystander: receive easy to understand and follow
instructions to help patient;
- Dispatcher/call taker: provide targeted support and instructions
to caller based on correct information;
- Paramedics: receive correct information to be well prepared
upon arrival to care for the patient;
- Patients’ family members: know that everything possible was
done to save the patient’s life and that no error occurred in the
process (human or machine); if the patient dies, they may look
for someone to hold responsible (the dispatcher/paramedic/AI
system?);
- AI vendor: profit, reputation, satisfied clients, avoid
malfunctioning of the system leading to poor performance
(e.g., death of the patient);
- Hospital system: improve efficiency and efficacy (i.e., number of
lives saved due to the system), reputational gains; and
- Public Health System in Denmark: improve efficiency and
efficacy (i.e., number of lives saved due to the AI system).
AI Pilot Testing
The system was introduced to the call takers by the primary
investigator of research (i.e., the owner of the use case), who
participated in four staff meetings, each of them consisting of an
hour training session. During these sessions, the AI system was
presented as well as the objectives of the research and the protocol
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the dispatchers should follow in case of an alert. There was a one-
month pilot testing where none of the alerts were randomized.
This was performed to allow most of the dispatchers to
experience an alert prior to the randomization start. During
this month, the primary investigator was present at the
Emergency Medical Dispatch Center of the City of
Copenhagen and available for dispatchers to address questions.
Develop of an Evidence Base
It is important at this point to review and create an evidence base
that we will use to verify/support any claims made by the
producer of the AI system and other relevant stakeholders.
For this case, we summarize here the most relevant findings.
OHCA is a major health care and socioeconomic problem
with a total survival rate of generally below 10 percent (Berdowski
et al., 2010; Gräsner et al., 2020; Virani et al., 2020). Time is of
utmost importance when treating OHCA, with chances of
survival decreasing rapidly in the first minutes after collapse.
Efficient emergency medical services should detect cardiac arrest
within the first minute (Perkins et al., 2015). Correct diagnosis
and treatment are needed within minutes in order to increase the
odds to attain a successful resuscitation. Every minute without
resuscitation decreases the probability of survival by ∼10% and
increases the risk of side-effects, such as brain damage (Murphy
et al., 1994).
Detecting OHCA is the “king quality indicator” across medical
services in Europe and the rest of the world (Wnent et al., 2015).
One reason for this is that cardiac arrest is the most time critical
incident, which an emergency medical service can respond to. If
the emergency service performs substandard to these incidents, it
would be a generally low quality proxy.
Therefore, recognition of OHCA is of the utmost importance
as a prerequisite for the initiation of life-saving treatments such as
CPR and defibrillation prior to the arrival of emergency medical
services (Holmén Johan et al., 2020). However, there are also risks
associated with administering CPR to a healthy person for a
longer period (∼10 min), as it can impact their health negatively
(Haley et al., 2011; Moriwaki et al., 2012). In cases of a
misdiagnosis, it is highly likely that the patient will respond at
this point.
The chance of survival decreases rapidly after the onset of
OHCA until the initiation of resuscitation efforts (CPR or
defibrillation), with models illustrating a decrease of roughly
10% per minute, leaving close to zero percent chance of
survival 15 min after collapse. Due to the loss of
circulation following OHCA, imminent treatment is of the
essence since the chance of survival rapidly decreases with
increased time from collapse to treatment (Cummins et al.,
1991; Larsen et al., 1993; Hasselqvist-Ax et al., 2015;
Monsieurs et al., 2015).
Survivors of OHCA may sustain brain injury due to
inadequate cerebral perfusion during cardiac arrest. Anoxic
brain damage after OHCA may result in a need for constant
care or assistance with activities of daily living. Persons with
anoxic brain damage may therefore require nursing home care
after discharge (Middelkamp et al., 2007; Moulaert et al., 2009).
Context and Processes, Where the AI System is Used
We look now at the context and process where the AI system is
used, including the interactions of actors with each other and with
the ML.
The AI system is listening in to all calls made to the emergency
medical services 112 emergency line. This includes calls for
various other reasons (e.g., car accidents); OHCA is only
responsible for ∼1% of all calls. With ∼65 dispatchers, every
dispatcher only encounters 10–20 cases of cardiac arrest per year
on average. It is reported that 1/2 of the human alerts were true
cardiac arrests, 1/5 of the machine alerts were true cardiac arrests
(Blomberg et al., 2021).
Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical case of a call where an actual
cardiac arrest is occurring: The patient is suffering a cardiac arrest
and is therefore lifeless. A bystander (e.g., spouse of the patient)
calls the 112 emergency-line and he/she is connected to a
dispatcher. The dispatcher is responsible for asking relevant
questions to the caller; the ML system is listening in on the
call but currently does not provide any questions to the caller or
the dispatcher. Once the system suspects a cardiac arrest, it shows
an “alert” to the dispatcher, who is then free to act upon this alert
or ignore it.
If the dispatcher agrees with the system in the detection of a
cardiac arrest, they instruct the caller to administer CPR to the
patient (very time-sensitive) and dispatch an ambulance,
including a doctor. They should then stay on the call until the
ambulance arrives.
The Technology Used
The prime stakeholder commissioned an external start-up
company to implement the AI system because they discovered
that off-the-shelf solutions did not work, due to poor sound
quality of the calls, and abnormal vocals (e.g., emotionally
distressed, shouting, etc.). Also, at that time (2018), no Danish
language model was readily available.
For this use case, the ML system was designed and
implemented with the expectation to detect cardiac arrest in
calls faster and more reliably than human operators. An initial
confirmation of this assumption was reported in a retrospective
study conducted by the prime stakeholders (Blomberg et al.,
2019).
They used a language model for translating the audio to text
based on a convolutional deep neural network (LeCun et al.,
1989). The ML model was trained and tested on datasets of audio
files of calls to the 112 emergency line made in 2014, provided by
the prime stakeholder to the company. Only the audio was used,
so other personal data was explicitly not used.
The text output of the language model was then fed to a
classifier that predicted whether a cardiac arrest was happening or
not (Figure 3). The AI system was applied directly on the audio
stream where the only processing made was a short-term Fourier
transformation (Havtorn et al., 2020), hence no explicit feature
selection was made.
The predictive model, working only on the text output of the
automatic speech recognition model, was predicted based on
the raw textual output. When an emergency call was analyzed in
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real-time by the ML framework, the audio file was processed
without any prior editing or transcription and transformed to
a textual representation of the call, which was then analyzed
and outputted as a prediction of cardiac arrest (Blomberg
et al., 2021).
Using a Danish language model means that calls in other
languages were interpreted in a way that the cardiac arrest model
could not work with (i.e., trying to understand Danish words
from English speech). In many cases, the model understood the
calls anyways, but in some cases not. So far, there is no
explanation why some calls were seemingly not understood.
There is no explanation of how the ML makes its predictions.
The company that developed the AI system has some of their
work in the open domain (Maaløe et al., 2019; Havtorn et al.,
2020). However, the exact details on the ML system used for this
use case are not publicly available.
FIGURE 2 | Ideal case of Interaction between Bystander, Dispatcher, and the ML System. (with permission from Blomberg et al., 2019).
FIGURE 3 | Ml data flow.
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The general principles used for this AI system are documented
in the study by (Havtorn et al., 2020). The paper describes the AI
model implemented for this use case. However, the paper
presents the model trained using different data sets and
therefore the results are not representative for this use case.
The details of the implementation of the AI system for this
case are proprietary, and therefore not known to our team.
Our expert team was informed by the prime stakeholder that
the AI system does not have a CE-certification as a medical
device.
AI Design Decisions
The assumption made by the designers of the AI system was that
there are some patterns in the conversations that the AI system
can detect and use to alert the call takers quicker than a human
dispatcher, for example, from the words chosen and from the
tone of a bystander.
The AI system analyses the conversation between the caller
and the dispatcher. It has access to the full audio, including
background noises. In its present implementation, if the AI
system is suspecting a cardiac arrest, it presents an alert to the
dispatcher. Currently, the system is only used for detecting
cardiac arrest and does not propose questions to the
dispatcher, based on the dispatcher’s previous conversations.
In a previous implementation of the AI system, background
noises caused the AI system to generate many false positives
(which would allocate resources to the wrong patients and
thereby delaying treatment for others that are in greater need).
Also, listening for agonal breathing has resulted in many false
positives. Busses passing outside, or chairs being dragged on the
floor, resulting in similar noises.
Agonal breathing (short, labored, gasping breaths that occur
because oxygen cannot reach the brain) (Roppolo et al., 2009) is
defined as “an abnormal breathing pattern originating from lower
brainstem neurons and characterized by labored breaths, gasping,
and, often, myoclonus and grunting.” (NCBI, 2021).
In some calls, the dispatcher asked the caller to put the phone
to the patient’s mouth to listen for breathing. However, this is
more an exception, and in the experience of the key stakeholders
rarely produces any results. When one can hear the agonal
breathing, it is quite distinct in the background. While agonal
breathing is highly predictive of OHCA, it can be perceived by a
layperson as normal breathing, leading to the misunderstanding
that the patient is alive and therefore not having OHCA.
Therefore, for the final version of the AI system, one key
design decision that the prime stakeholder took together with the
software developers of the vendor company was to censor the ML
model to disregard background noises in order to avoid too many
false positives, even though some noises gave a good indication of
a current cardiac arrest.
In its present implementation, the AI model therefore only
listens to the words spoken by the caller and the dispatcher. The
AI is converting the audio files into text files representing words.
The call is transcribed, but the model is more complicated than
just words. It is looking for patterns in questions and answers. For
example, if the caller replies yes to a question of unconsciousness,
then the probability of cardiac arrest goes up. If then the caller
mentions blue lips, the probability goes up. If both are
positive—patient unconscious and blue lips –, then the alert
goes off, as described in an interview with our expert team by
the prime stakeholder.
The medical dispatchers were involved in designing the alert
that the system shows if it has detected signals indicating cardiac
arrest. The dispatchers were consulted during several workshops
conducted by the prime stakeholder. Callers and patients have
not been involved in the system design with the reasoning that
patients are clinically dead and callers are not concerned with
how the system presents itself to the dispatcher.
AI Design Trade-Offs
Design choice depends on the perspective used by the prime
stakeholders. There was a conscious key choice during system
design to focus on high sensitivity over high specificity, as the
prime stakeholder considered potential harm by a false negative
much higher than the potential harm of a false positive. However,
there was a trade-off as to not create too many false positives that
undermine the credibility of the system and also waste of
resources, with the unintended consequence that if there are
not enough resources, then other patients can be harmed due to
the false-positive result.
Clinical Studies
The primary stakeholders performed two studies: 1) A
retrospective study performed before they deployed the AI
system in production (Blomberg et al., 2019); and later on, 2)
a randomized clinical trial (Blomberg et al., 2021) whose results
were published after the AI system was already in production. For
both studies, the same model was used—i.e., there were no
changes to architecture or retraining between the studies.
Retrospective Study
In the retrospective study, the authors examined whether the ML
system could recognize OHCA by analyzing the audio files of
108,607 emergency calls made in 2014 to the emergency medical
dispatcher center. The performance of the ML system was
compared to the actual recognition and time-to-recognition of
cardiac arrest by medical dispatchers.
Out of 108,607 emergency calls, 0.8% (918) of the calls were
OHCA calls eligible for analysis. Compared with medical
dispatchers, the ML system had a lower positive predictive
value than dispatchers (20.9 vs. 33.0%, p < 0.0001). Time-to-
recognition was shorter for the ML system compared to the
dispatchers (median 44 vs. 54 s, p < 0.001) (Blomberg et al., 2019).
Many times, the ML system was only slightly faster than the
human, but in some calls, it was minutes faster than the
dispatcher and well within the 1 min detection limit, making a
huge practical difference in those cases.
The AI model for this use case was found to be more sensitive
than the dispatcher but less specific. There were also cases where
the model missed cardiac arrest, while the dispatcher did not
(Blomberg et al., 2019). In some cases, this might come from the
language barrier, as the system was only trained on Danish data,
but the dispatchers understand more languages (i.e., English,
German).
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False negatives were identified with the help of the Danish
Cardiac Arrest Register (Dansk Hjertestopregister, 2020). The
register collects all emergency cases where either a bystander or
ambulance personnel are applying CPR or defibrillation. The data
is collected by ambulance personnel.
Randomized Clinical Trial
In the randomized clinical trial of 5242 emergency calls, the ML
model was listening to calls and could alert the medical
dispatchers in cases of suspected cardiac arrest. This way, it
was possible to check how fast the machine could make a
prediction compared to the human dispatchers. The
dispatchers were instructed how to interact with the system: if
they saw the alert symbol, they were instructed to repeat the
questions for patient consciousness and if the patient was
breathing.
In this randomized clinical trial, an extensive study of calls was
done in relation to the retrospective study to compare if the
dispatcher was trying to persuade the caller to perform CPR in
these cases.
In some cases, the patient collapsed during the call. The
patient was reported as being alive at the beginning of the
conversation, but once the ambulance arrived, they had to
administer CPR.
Sometimes the machine predicted cardiac arrest while the
patient was not suffering any symptoms, but when the ambulance
arrived at the call site, the patient did suffer a cardiac arrest.
In this clinical trial, the humans and the AI system missed the
same patients. However, the AI system missed fewer.
During the interview with the prime stakeholders, we were
told that benchmarking dispatchers was not done as this was not
part of the task, but also due to not wanting to jeopardize the
cooperation between the researchers and the medical dispatchers.
While it might be possible to use anonymized data, with 65
dispatchers and ∼1,000 cardiac arrests per year, the sample is also
very small. Finding reasons on why some dispatchers might
perform worse than others was also not a goal of this trial.
Real time performance on actual emergency calls is
comparable to the one reported in the retrospective study
(Blomberg et al., 2021).
The result of this clinical trial was that “there was no
significant improvement in recognition of out-of-hospital
cardiac arrest during calls on which the model alerted
dispatchers vs. those on which it did not; however, the
machine learning model had higher sensitivity that dispatchers
alone” (Blomberg et al., 2021).
The authors concluded that “these findings suggest that while
a machine learning model recognized a significantly greater
number of out-of-hospital cardiac arrests than dispatchers
alone, this did not translate into improved cardiac arrest
recognition by dispatchers” (Blomberg et al., 2021).
Intellectual Property
For this use case, the AI software (i.e., the AImodel) is proprietary
to the company that implemented it, but the data used for
training and testing the ML model belongs to the prime
stakeholder of the use case.
Due to the proprietary model and the personal data used, we
were not able to reproduce the architecture and train the AI from
scratch to conduct an independent evaluation of its performance.
However, the authors of the randomized clinical trial provided an
aggregated and anonymized dataset for analysis. This dataset did
not contain audio data, but information on e.g., call length, sex
and age of the caller, the recognition time of both dispatcher and
AI system and whether the suspected OHCA could be confirmed
later. With this data we could reproduce and confirm the findings
of the randomized clinical trial (Blomberg et al., 2021).
The Legal Framework
The ML model in this use case is used by medical personnel to
guide them inmaking an evaluation of the patient so that they can
act accordingly. This process is not fully described by the Danish
Health Act Sundhedsloven6, but it is described to some extent by
the Patient Danish Authority (STPS)7. As the use of AI in health
services is fairly new, the Danish authorities have apparently not
yet decided how this new technology shall be regulated. In
particular, it is very likely that the AI system should be
classified as a medical device and thus being subject to
medical device requirements. However, in the present state of
the assessment we did not fully assess whether the prime
stakeholder has obtained all authorizations needed. Since the
AI system processes personal data, the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) (European Parliament and Council of
European Union, 2016) applies, and the prime stakeholder
must comply with its requirements. We do not assess here
whether the AI system complies with the law. According to
the prime stakeholder, the applicable laws have been followed.
THE IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE
ETHICAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES
In this step of the Assess Phase, we identified possible ethical and
technical and legal issues for the use of the AI within the given
boundaries and context (see list of actors above). For some ethical
issues, a tension may occur. We use the definition of tension from
Whittlestone et al. (2019), which refers to different ways in which
values can be in conflict—i.e., tensions between the pursuit of
different values in technological applications rather than an
abstract tension between the values themselves.
The scenarios representing different usage situations of the
system were discussed with a number of experts and when
necessary other stakeholders.
The experts examined phase by phase according to the
trustworthy ethical values requirements in order to define
potential ethical issues and cross-checked against each phase
of the scenario to identify possible ethical issues arising,
discussed them, described them and reported at each step and
documented.
6https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2019/903, LBK nr 903 af 26/08/2019
7https://en.stps.dk/en/
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In this part of the process, we left space for the experts to
explore and identify possible “issues” using an open vocabulary.
They described the ethical issues and what we call “flags” in their
own words, bringing their own expertize and different
background and view points. With a flag, we denote any other
issues, i.e., that could refer to technical and ethical and/or any
combination of.
The process used to reach consensus is made transparent so
that it is possible to go back and re-assess possible relevant
changes in the ecosystems.
Describe Ethical Issues and Tensions:
Methodology
To describe and classify the ethical issues and flags, identify
ethical tensions (if any) and describe them, a selected number of
experts in our team were asked, with interdisciplinary skills, e.g.,
experts in ethics, philosophy, policy, law, domain experts, ML.
Such a variety of backgrounds is necessary to identify all aspects
of the ethical implications of using AI. While the interdisciplinary
nature of the team is essential, it can pose a challenge on how to
reach a consensus among the various experts.
Discussion—Initial Findings
By analyzing the scenario of usage for this use case, the following
initial preliminary issues were observed and described. As
mentioned, in this phase, the issues are described using an
open vocabulary.
A selection of the initial findings is presented in the rest of this
section.
Tensions in the Evidence Base
There is a tension between the conclusions from the retrospective
study (Blomberg et al., 2019), indicating that the ML framework
performed better than emergency medical dispatchers for
identifying OHCA in emergency phone calls—and therefore
with the expectation that the ML could play an important role
as a decision support tool for emergency medical dispatchers-,
and the results of a randomized control trial performed later
(September 2018–January 2020) (Blomberg et al., 2021), which
did not show any benefits in using the AI system in practice.
We were told in an interview with the prime stakeholder that
patients were not study participants in this randomized control
trial. The rationale that was given to us is that if they should have
studied patient outcomes, the trial should have either be a
multicenter study or continue for approximate eight years.
Possible Lack of Trust
For our assessment, it is important to find out whether and how
the ML system influences the interaction between the human
actors, i.e., how it influences the conversation between the caller/
bystander and the dispatcher, the duration of the call, and the
outcome, and why during the clinical trial the use of the AI system
did not translate into improved cardiac arrest recognition by
dispatchers (Blomberg et al., 2021).
Some possible hypotheses that need to be verified are listed in
the following.
The dispatcher possibly did not trust the cardiac arrest alert. It
might depend on how the system was introduced—how the well-
known cognitive biases were presented/labeled—if the use of the
system was labeled as a learning opportunity for the dispatcher,
and not as a failure detection aid, that would disclose the
incompetence of the dispatcher.
We reported this. To assess this, it would be desirable to look
for potential patterns of, for example, cognitive bias in the
dispatchers and provide specific feedback to the dispatcher.
Another hypothesis is that the case aims for performance
(or accuracy), so if the machine works well enough, the
alerts will be accepted. In this case, the trust might be
increased by how the system is presented if the people
who implement it confer the idea of a “growth mindset”
that dispatchers could identify with, that might really
improve uptake and trust.
But it could be that dispatchers did not sufficiently pay
attention to the output of the machine. It relates to the
principle of human agency and oversight in trustworthy AI
mentioned in the rest of this section. Why exactly is this?
There seems to be a tension concerning the role of dispatchers
in designing the algorithmic output.
Perhaps certain sounds should also be used to ensure that the
dispatcher perceived the urgency of the algorithmic output? One
additional idea is that the look and functionality of the alert does
not perform as it should, perhaps because the dispatchers have
been part of designing it themselves?
What makes them knowledgeable about how to get them to
react in the way desired? Perhaps they are biased against a design
that would make them feel the pressure to follow the machine?
Additional Tensions
If one of the reasons why dispatchers are not following the system
to the desired degree is that they find the AI system to have too
many false positives, then this issue relates to the challenge of
achieving a satisfactory interaction outcome between dispatchers
and system.
Another tension concerns whether dispatchers should be
allowed to overrule a positive prediction made by the system
and not just merely overrule a negative prediction by the system.
In particular, what exactly is the right interplay or form of
interaction between system and human, given the goals of
using the system and the documented performance of human
and system?
Medical Benefits—Risks Vs. Benefits
Possible Risks and Harm: False Positives and False
Negatives
One of the biggest risks for this use case is where a correct
dispatcher would be overruled by an incorrect AI system.
The AI system does not predict “no cardiac arrest,” but only
positive predictions are shown. Hence, if a dispatcher suspects a
cardiac arrest, the machine does not change this, but the
dispatcher would not necessarily be affirmed. However, the
dispatcher’s actions might trick the machine into believing it is
a cardiac arrest, as the conversation might take a turn and start
sounding like cardiac arrest to the machine.
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We could not find a justification for choosing a certain balance
between sensitivity and specificity.
If specificity is too low, CPR is started on people who do not
need it and administered CPR over a longer period of time can
lead to rib cage fractures, for example. However, it is unlikely that
CPRwould be performed on a conscious patient for a longer time,
as the patient probably would fight back against it.
If sensitivity is too low, cardiac arrests may not be detected.
This results in no CPR being administered and the patient
remains dead. In this context “too low” is when the AI system
performs poorer than the dispatchers, hence will not be of any
help. The AI system is evaluated against human performance, as
this system is only useful if it can assist humans; otherwise, it is
just a distraction.
The idea that it is a serious defect if the machine does not
confirm a correct positive call by a dispatcher points to an ethical
tension concerning the machine-dispatcher interaction.
While it seems to be a great harm if a dispatcher did not follow
her judgment due to a lack of confirmation from the machine, it
should also be considered whether this is any worse than having a
dispatcher wrongly ignoring a true positive call by a machine, and
if so, why?
From the point of view of the person suffering a cardiac arrest,
the harm of either mistake would be the same. In fact, given that
the machine has, for example, a 10% higher sensitivity than
dispatchers, it can be expected that allowing dispatchers to ignore
positive calls from the machine will result in more deaths overall
as compared to making it compulsive for dispatchers to follow the
machine’s advice.
Thus, there is a tension between allowing dispatchers to ignore
machine advice, perhaps to maintain full human control and
responsibility for the decision-making, and saving all the lives
that one could save by making dispatchers obliged to follow the
advice of the machine.
Ethical Tension Related to the Design of the AI System
A number of questions were raised during the analysis of the use
of the AI system.
AI Human Interactions Design Limitations
Currently, there is no structured way for feedback from the
ambulance medics to the dispatchers.
We noted that there is no learning possibility in the current
system—compared with other contexts such as aviation security,
where “individuals’ attitudes (as opposed to personalities) are
relatively malleable to training interventions and predict
performance” (Sexton et al., 2000).
For our assessment, it is important to verify: Is it possible that
by improving the set of questions, it will also be possible to
improve the ML classifier? This question would ask for biological
descriptors—such as does he look pale, can he move, etc. It would
make sense for the dispatcher to ask questions that are tailored to
aid the ML classifier to reduce the risk of false alerts/non-alerts.
An additional serious challenge is that AI is based only on
conversations and language with all connected risks of emotional
language miscomprehension of dialect or not a native speaker.
Lack of Explainability
Our team of experts did not sign a Non Disclosure Agreement
(NDA) with the vendor company, and that means that the AI
system is considered a “black box,” with no details of the
implementation of the AI algorithms and the AI model. To
avoid possible conflict of interests, no direct communication
between our team of experts and the vendor company was
(and is) taking place.
The prime stakeholder cooperates with the vendor company,
and they have declared no conflict of interest with them.
The main issue here is that it is not apparent to the dispatchers
how the AI system comes to its conclusions. It is not transparent
to the dispatcher whether it is advisable to follow the system or
not. Moreover, it is not transparent to the caller that an AI system
is used in the process.
If transparency, at least in part, concerns the ability to
understand why and how the AI system comes to produce a
certain output given a certain input, then transparency about the
values that have guided and justified the trade-offs would seem
relevant. There is increasing awareness of the many ways in which
the design of an AI system involves value-based judgments
(Biddle, 2020). Examples of this type of judgment include
when designers of the system decide how to balance the costs
of false positives and false negatives, but also trade-offs between
accuracy and explainability, and between different formal and
potentially conflicting definitions of algorithmic fairness, such as
equality of error rates and equality of predictive value across
socially salient groups would ideally be explicated.
Diversity, Non-Discrimination, and Fairness: Possible
Bias, Lack of Fairness
It was reported in one of the workshops that if the caller was not
with the patient, such as in another room or in a car on their way
to the patient, the AI system had more false negatives. The same
was found for people not speaking Danish or with a heavy dialect.
For this use case, concepts such as “bias” and “fairness” are
domain-specific and should be considered at various levels of
abstractions (e.g., from the viewpoint of the healthcare actors
down to the level of the ML model).
We look at possible bias in the use of the AI system. The AI
system was only trained on Danish data, but the callers spoke
more languages (i.e., English, German). Here, there is a risk of
bias, as the system brings disadvantages for some groups, such as
non-Danish speaking callers, callers speaking dialects, etc.
A serious challenge is that AI is based only on conversations
and language with all connected risks of emotional language
miscomprehension of dialect or non-native speakers. There is a
risk that the AI system does not work equally well with all ethnic
groups. It works best with Danish-speaking callers. It actually has
a lower degree of being able to handle caller diversity than the
dispatchers, who sometimes speak several languages. Thus, ethnic
minorities would be discriminated against.
When we looked at the data used to train the ML model, we
observed that the dataset used to train the ML system was created
by collecting data from the Copenhagen Emergency Medical
Services from 2014.
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The AI system was tested with data from calls between
September 1, 2018, and December 31, 2019. It appears to be
biased toward older males, with no data on race and ethnicity.
We suspect this methodology to present risks of unwanted
discrimination against minorities and under-represented races
and sex. Multiple factors could bias the system, such as accent or
words used. Predictions for individuals outside of training
distributions would likely be less accurate, and dispatchers
would misuse this information.
At the same time, older males are the most frequent
“consumers” of health care when it comes to cardiac arrest, so
is this really a bias? And even if this is defined as a bias, we might
need to acknowledge why such a bias emerged in the first place.
Likely, the calls that were used in training the ML were with
older males.
In general, AI encodes the same biases present in society,
whether through algorithmic design or biased data sets (Owens
and Walker, 2020).
Risk of De-Skilling
For this use case, a problem is the responsibility and liability of the
dispatcher. What are the possible legal liability implications for
ignoring an alert coming from a ML system?
The consequences of refuse or acceptance of an alert are
central. There is a need of justification of choice: in this field,
the risk of de-skilling is possible (technological delegation
also in order not to be considered reliable for ignoring/
refusing it); we also need to think about the cultural level
of a dispatcher and the ethical awareness of the consequences
of they choice: how could they decide against the machine?
Sometimes it could be easier to accept than to ignore/refuse
for many reasons.
Risk of Alert Fatigue
In the randomized clinical trial (Blomberg et al., 2021), it was
reported that less than one in five alerts were true positives. Such
low sensitivity might lead to alert fatigue, and in turn, ignoring
true alerts. However, the dispatcher is always ultimately liable,
meaning if they ignore a true positive, they will need to provide
rationale.
The alert fatigue is important and needs to be investigated
because one wants to make sure that the AI fits neatly in the
medical workflow and actually improves patient outcomes. If it
turns out that the dispatcher is not following it because of alert
fatigue, this would be a problem (also likely from a liability
perspective).
A follow-up question would be what the interaction between
the human and the AI system should be. It may be (depending on
data of human factors testing in the real world) that a fully
autonomous AI will be safer than having too many other human
decisions involved (that said, it may be that in this particular
situation, there shouldn’t be a discretion not to follow an alert; of
course under the condition that the AI is highly accurate).
Does the dispatcher need to know how the ML works and the
ways it can make mistakes?
Ignoring the alert is a feasible option—if the dispatcher can
produce a good reason for ignoring it. In order to provide such a
rationale, the dispatchers ought to be educated in the inner
working of a ML-model, and how it might produce false alerts.
It is questionable, however, whether it is realistic to assume
that the dispatcher will actually ignore the system.
Human Agency and Oversight
The requirement for human agency and oversight seeks to ensure
that AI is used to put people in a position to make more informed
decisions, not necessarily to make the decisions for them. It
specifically recognizes a “right not to be subject to a decision
based solely on automated processing when this [. . .] significantly
affects them” (AI HLEG, 2019, p. 16).
For this case, the issue of the dispatcher having to distinguish if
the alert is valid or not is a major challenge. Support is needed to
extract important signals during the call that can be difficult for a
human to discern on their own. However, this use case also
surfaced many other issues with an AI support system. Is it
possible for those who are impacted by the decisions made by AI
to challenge them? Is there sufficient human oversight (Hickman
and Petrin, 2020)?
It seems that the dispatchers’ agency and autonomous
decision-making are reduced by the system. The assumption is
that the dispatchers do not primarily rely on their own decision-
making but take the system into consideration. However, they do
not know what criteria the system uses for its suggestions/advice/
decisions.
This is a case of agency in AI where agents and those being
impacted (i.e., the wider public) should be better informed about
what criteria are used to determine the AI output. In this way, the
AI acts as an educator to improve the dispatcher’s abilities.
Insofar, this is supposed to be a shared control system, in
which part of the responsibility is conferred to the system,
without the dispatchers knowing details about the decision-
making criteria or the reliability of the system. The inclusion
of the ML system clearly decreases the dispatchers’ autonomy.
This may reduce the dispatchers’ engagement in the process
and diminish their sense of agency. What is the basis for
dispatchers to decide whether to follow the system’s
suggestion or not? Are there any criteria? It could be useful to
build a heuristic tool that informs the dispatcher when and when
not to rely on the system, for example, to put a disclaimer in place
in certain situations (see above).
Furthermore, the question needs to be addressed of how a
balance between ML system and dispatcher input in the shared
decision-making process can be achieved. Who is it who oversees
the process? Is the process controlled by the advice given by some
supervisor to dispatchers of whether or not they are supposed to
follow the system’s output?
Alternatively, dispatchers could decide not to follow the
system’s advice, which would make it obsolete.
Privacy and Data Governance
A data protection impact assessment in accordance with Article
35 GDPRmust be carried out for this AI system. According to the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), an informed and
explicit consent is required for the processing of sensitive data,
such as health data. This requirement can be waived, e.g., if the
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vital interests of the data subject are affected and she or he is
incapable to give consent. From a data protection perspective,
GDPR requirements are extensive and evolving (European
Parliament and Council of European Union, 2016). Specific
concerns for this use case include the caller’s lack of awareness
(and therefore consent) that an AI system is included in the
process and that the call is used for analysis and research.
The possibility of a right to explanation under the GDPR may
also pose difficulties to the extent that human understanding of
the AI process is limited. A proper legal review will be needed to
assess the compliance of the system with the GDPR’s
requirements. The benefits that arise from AI are rooted in the
processing of large quantities of data. However, this usage evokes
inherent conflicts with the protection of privacy and integrity of
and access to data. The AI HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines call
for data governance policies and systems that “cover [s] the
quality and integrity of the data used, its relevance in light of
the domain in which the AI systems will be deployed, its access
protocols and the capability to process data in a manner that
protects privacy”. This raises the challenge of ensuring the use of
AI is both transparent and overseen while also ensuring
individual privacy (Abbott, 2020).
The goal of the GDPR is the protection of fundamental rights
and freedoms of natural persons (Art. 1). These are determined in
accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union and the European Convention on Human
Rights. This also includes the right to non-discrimination
pursuant to Article 21 Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is
relevant for this use case, as the system had more false negatives
for people not speaking Danish or with a heavy dialect.
From a data protection perspective, the prime stakeholder of
the use case is in charge of fulfilling the legal requirements. From
a risk-based perspective, it would be desirable if the developers of
the system would also be responsible as they implemented the AI
system. But the responsibility of the vendors or developers of a
system is not a requirement of the GDPR.
Possible Accountability Issues
For this use case, the AI HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines require
“that mechanisms be put in place to ensure responsibility and
accountability for AI systems” and emphasizes the importance of
redress when unjust adverse impact occurs (AI HLEG, 2019, p.
19f). In matters of human health, particularly those with life or
death consequences, as in this use case, the potential harm can be
substantial both in non-monetary and in monetary terms.
Mechanisms that allow for redress in case of the occurrence of
any harm or adverse impact are therefore particularly important.
Accountability, in the form that the AI HLEG trustworthy AI
guidelines address them, is arguably, for the most part, non-legal
in nature. For instance, accountability in this sense may refer to
auditability that enables affected parties to assess algorithms, data
and design processes; minimization and reporting of negative
impacts; consideration and balancing of trade-offs when there are
tensions between various ethical principles; and redress other
than liability in the technical sense. Nevertheless, in practice,
there will almost inevitably be certain interactions between non-
legal “ethical” principles and legal principles, and it is difficult to
completely separate the two. In particular, the use case discussed
herein raises important medical liability questions (some of which
have already been alluded to above).
Due to the diffusion of responsibility that is typical for AI
technology, however, the operation of such mechanisms is more
complex than in usual medical liability cases. For this use case,
different actors (such as the institution using the AI, the
manufacturers of the AI, or those in charge of oversight of the
AI) could potentially be responsible for the harm. It is therefore
very difficult for any injured person to prove specific causation
contributions or to show that an AI system was “defective”. In
fact, such proof would require knowledge of the details of the AI
algorithms’ and the AI models’ implementation—which are,
however, proprietary of the company who implemented them
(on intellectual property issues, see above).
Accordingly, it is also difficult to put mechanisms in place to
provide information to (end-)users and third parties about
opportunities for redress, as required by the AI HLEG
trustworthy AI guidelines (AI HLEG, 2019, p. 31). As long as
the algorithm is unknown, nothing more than general guidelines
can be disclosed to these parties. Still, the parties involved in
designing, developing, deploying, implementing, and using the AI
system should consider how—in line with the AI HLEG
trustworthy AI guidelines—they can enhance the
accountability factors mentioned above. This could include
facilitating audit processes, if appropriate via evaluation by
internal and external auditors, and creating avenues for
redress apart from the pre-existing legal avenues available to
those negatively affected by AI.
Societal and Environmental Well-Being
We consider here broader implications, such as additional costs
that could arise from an increase in false positives by the AI
system, resulting in unnecessary call taker assisted CPRs, and
dispatching ambulances when they are not necessary, and trade-
offs, by detracting resources from other areas.
MAP ETHICAL ISSUES AND FLAGS TO
TRUSTWORTHY AI AREAS OF
INVESTIGATION
Our group faced a counterintuitive problem as we began
analyzing ethical issues. It was not difficult in locating issues
and responding to them. Instead, the challenge was to stop
responding. The diversity of our group members opened so
many angles and subjects of interest that our project was
threatened by too much success: left to our own devices, we
would have discussed interminably.
To convert our work from theoretical discussion into practical
and applicable results, we took two steps. First, we limited the set
of ethical principles and approaches that we would employ.
Concretely, we opted for the EC Ethics Guidelines for
Trustworthy AI because it is a widely recognized set of
principles. We also selected the list of frequent AI ethical
tensions cataloged by the Nuffield Foundation (Whittlestone
et al., 2019), because they are so well explained and accessible.
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Second, we forced consensus by having each participant
commit their personal thoughts to a short rubric. It
required that each ethical dilemma and tension be
narrated in our own individual words and then mapped
onto the Ethics Guidelines. We found that the structured
approach helped funnel our thinking into a single, coherent
set of results that we could apply to the case. One drawback of
this modular approach is that it does sacrifice some ethical
nuance. However, the benefit of a common ethical language
and structure for thought is that a sizable group of experts
from diverse backgrounds can efficiently work toward a
single and useful set of results.
To avoid decision-bias, we distributed the work into four
independent Working Groups (WG), created according to the
skills and expertize of the various team members. The four
working groups are: WG Ethics, WG Law/Healthcare, WG
Healthcare and WG ML.
Distinct subgroups adopted different strategies for arriving at
an internal consensus, in order to be mindful of relevant
cognitive biases for different modes of expertize. The
expectation was that distinct paths to consensus may be
more or less suited to providing external validity checks
on the judgments of particular Z-Inspection® participants.
As an example of this procedure, the ethics and law subgroup
first selected two volunteers to lead their internal discussions.
The wider group of four participants then held 2–3 separate
calls to go through the ethical issues already flagged during
the Assess Phase by all participants. The subgroup discussed
these to see if they were covered by previous work (e.g.,
GDPR) or not, as well as what assurance(s) had already been
given by the team on, for example, data storage and
protection. The ethical issues were then given distinctive
titles, descriptions, and narratives as needed to make sure
they did not overlap with each other. The two subgroup
leaders then gave these updated descriptions to the
Z-Inspection® lead, where they were joined with the
descriptions provided by other subgroups.
While this use case directly refers to the use of ML as a
supportive tool to recognize cardiac arrest in emergency calls,
there are various ways in which the findings of this qualitative
analysis could be applicable to other contexts. First, the
general framework for achieving trustworthy AI sets out in
the HLEG AI guidelines proved to be an adequate starting
point for a specific case study discussion in the healthcare
domain. Second, the ethical principles of the HLEG AI
guidelines need some context-specific specifications. Third,
this contextualization and specification can successfully be
undertaken by an interdisciplinary group of researchers that
together is able to not only bring in the relevant scientific,
medical, ethical, legal, and technological expertize but also to
highlight the various facets of the ethical principles as they
play out in the respective case.
This layered approach allowed to minimize (cognitive) biases
in our assessment approach. Since several groups worked
independently, it was not possible that one view would
influence all participants, as it would potentially happen in
one meeting with all experts.
Each working group worked independently, narrated each
discussed ethical dilemma and tension, and flags (i.e., other
issues) in their own words, and mapped each one onto ethics
principles and tensions. Concretely this meant taking the four
pillars of the AI HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines (Respect for
Human Autonomy, Prevention of Harm, Fairness, Explicability)
and selecting the one the WG found the most apt. Each of those
pillars has a number of requirements, from which the WG
selected, and then each requirement contains sub-
requirements, which were also selected. The list of
requirements and sub-requirements is listed below (AI HLEG,
2019):
REQUIREMENT #1 Human Agency and Oversight
Sub-requirements:
Human Agency and Autonomy
Human Oversight
REQUIREMENT #2 Technical Robustness and Safety




Fall-back plans and Reproducibility









REQUIREMENT #5 Diversity, Non-Discrimination and
Fairness
Sub-requirements:
Avoidance of Unfair Bias
Accessibility and Universal Design
Stakeholder Participation
REQUIREMENT #6 Societal and Environmental Well-Being
Sub-requirements: Environmental Well-Being
Impact on Work and Skills





To help the process, especially as a help to experts who might
not have sufficient knowledge in ethics, we used a sample of
catalog of predefined ethical tensions. We have chosen the catalog
defined by the Nuffield Foundations (Whittlestone et al., 2019),
indicated in the box below.
When a specific “issue” did not correspond to one or more of
the predefined ethical tensions, experts described them with their
own words. The results of four WGs are then “merged” into one
consolidated mapping using a consensus workshop. We present
here the consolidated mapping for this use case.
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ETHICAL ISSUES
ID Ethical Issue: E1, Dispatcher Accept/
Reject Prompt
Description
It is unclear whether the dispatcher should be advised or
controlled by the AI, and it is unclear how the ultimate
decision is made.
Map to Ethical Pillars/Requirements/
Sub-Requirements (Closed Vocabulary)
Respect for Human Autonomy > Human Agency and
Oversight > Human Agency and Autonomy.
Narrative Response
Importantly, any use of an AIsystem in the healthcare
system needs to be accompanied by a clear definition of its
use. In the current setting, it is unclear how the decision
support tool, should be used by the dispatchers. Should
they defer to the tool’s decision (especially since the
performance seems to surpass human capabilities)? And if
they do not defer to the tool, do they need to justify the
decision? We also need to take into account that the
dispatchers in Denmark are highly trained professionals that
will not easily defer to an automated tool without a certain level
of clinical validation and trust in the system. Despite the fact
that the dispatchers are the primary users, they were not
involved in the system design.
ID Ethical Issue: E2, Caller’s and Patient’s
Personally Identifying Information
Description
To what extent is the caller’s personally identifying information
protected, and who has access to information about the caller?
Map to Ethical Pillars/Requirements/
Sub-Requirements (Closed Vocabulary)
Prevention of Harm > Privacy and Data Governance > Privacy
Prevention of Harm > Privacy and Data Governance > Data
Governance.
Narrative Response
The main issue here is whether and how the data can be
identified and traced back to particular stakeholders. The
study participants claimed to follow the GDPR standards put
in place by the EU, which in this case did help specify the
respective roles of the dispatcher, caller, and AI system.
However, these descriptions must be augmented by
protections that further specify how data will be used and
stored, for how long this will occur before its disposal, and
what form(s) of anonymization will be maintained so that only
trusted, legitimized parties can access the identifying
information directly.
ID Ethical Issue: E3, Informed Consent/
Research Ethics Committee
Description
It is unclear whether the study participants should be the medical
dispatchers, the patients, or both.
Map to Ethical Pillars/Requirements/
Sub-Requirements (Closed Vocabulary)
Respect for Human Autonomy > Fundamental Rights > Human
Agency and Autonomy.
Narrative Response
There is a question of whether a research ethics board should have
reviewed the study; the need for an ethical approval was
waived here by the research ethics committee in the Capital
Region of Denmark. Written informed consent was only
obtained by the medical dispatchers. However, there is the
question of whether there should have been a formal ethical
review and a community consultation process, or a form of
surrogate or deferred consent, to address the ethical
implications regarding trial patients, as is common in
comparable studies reviewed by institutional review boards
in the United States and United Kingdom.
ID Ethical Issue: E4, Fairness in the Training
Data
Description
The training data is likely not sufficient to account for relevant
differences in languages, accents, and voice patterns, potentially
generating unfair outcomes.
Map to Ethical Pillars/Requirements/
Sub-Requirements (Closed Vocabulary)
Fairness > Diversity, Non-Discrimination and Fairness >
Avoidance of Unfair Bias.
Narrative Response
There is likely empirical bias since the tool was developed in a
predominantly white Danish patient group. It is unclear how the
tool would perform in patients with accents, different ages, sex,
and other specific subgroups. There is also a concern that this
tool is not evaluated for fairness with respect to outcomes in a
variety of populations. Given the reliance on transcripts, non-
native speakers of Danish may not have the same outcome. It
was reported that Swedish and English speakers were well
represented but would need to ensure a broad training set. It
would also be important to see if analyses show any bias in
Sample Catalog of Ethical Tensions (Whittlestone et al., 2019).






Satisfaction of preferences vs. equality;
Efficiency vs. safety and sustainability.
Frontiers in Human Dynamics | www.frontiersin.org July 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 67310416
Zicari et al. On Assessing Trustworthy AI in Healthcare
results regarding age, gender, race, nationality, and other sub-
groups. The concern is that the training data may not have a
diverse enough representation.
ID Ethical Issue: E5, Potential Harm
Resulting From Tool Performance
Description
The tool’s characteristic performance, such as a higher rate of
false positives compared to human dispatchers, could adversely
affect health outcomes for patients.
Map to Ethical Pillars/Requirements/
Sub-Requirements (Closed Vocabulary)
Prevention of Harm > Technical Robustness and Safety >
Accuracy.
Narrative Response
The algorithm did not appear to reduce the effectiveness of
emergency dispatchers but also did not significantly improve it.
The algorithm, in general, has a higher sensitivity but also leads
to more false positives. There should be a firm decision on
thresholds for false positive vs. false negatives. The risk of not
doing CPR if someone needs CPR exceeds the risk of doing CPR
if not needed. On the other hand, excessive false positives put a
strain on healthcare resources by sending out ambulances and
staff to false alarms. This potentially harms other patients in
need of this resource. The gold standard to assess whether the
tool is helpful for the given use case is to analyze its impact on
outcome. Given, however, the low likelihood of survival from
out of hospital cardiac arrest, there wasn’t an analysis
attempting to assess the impact on survival, as it would take
years in a unicentric study.
ID Ethical Issue: E6, The AI tool is not
Interpretable
Description
The system outputs cannot be interpreted, leading to challenges
when dispatcher and tool are in disagreement.
Map to Ethical Pillars/Requirements/
Sub-Requirements (Closed Vocabulary)
Explicability > Transparency > Explainability.
Narrative Response
The tool lacks explainability, which might lead to several
challenges. First, outcomes are based on a transcription of the
conversation between dispatcher and caller. It is not clear what is
used from these transcripts to trigger an alert. This lack of
transparency may have contributed to the noted lack of trust
among the dispatchers, as well as the limited training of the users.
Second, there is a lack of transparency regarding whether and
which value judgments went into the design of the model. Such
value judgments are important because explaining the output is
partly a matter of accounting for the design decisions that
humans have made.
ID Ethical Issue: E7, Cybersecurity
Description
The model may suffer from security vulnerabilities due to cyber
attacks.
Map to Ethical Pillars/Requirements/
Sub-Requirements (Closed Vocabulary)
Prevention of Harm -> Technical Robustness and Safety ->
Resilience to Attack and Security.
Narrative Response
The data should also be adequately protected against potential
cyber-attacks. In particular, since the model is not interpretable, it
seems hard to determine resistance to adversarial attack
scenarios, such as the importance of age, gender, accents,
bystander’s type, etc.
ID Ethical Issue: E8, Utility of the System
Description
The added value of the system to particular stakeholders is
not clear.
Map to Ethical Pillars/Requirements/
Sub-Requirements (Closed Vocabulary)
Prevention of Harm > Societal and Environmental Wellbeing >
Impact on Society at Large or Democracy.
Narrative Response
The AI system did not significantly improve the dispatcher’s
ability to recognize cardiac arrests. AIs should improve medical
practice rather than disrupting it or making it more complicated.
Where should the line be drawn? How much improvement is
needed to conclude that an AI system should be deployed in
clinical practice? Will it be cost-effective (worth the electric bill,
energy, and compute power) to run theMLmodel?What would it
take to guarantee this?
ID Ethical Issue: E9, Design of Clinical Trials
Description
The trials conducted did not include a diverse group of patients or
dispatchers.
Map to Ethical Pillars/Requirements/
Sub-Requirements (Closed Vocabulary)
Fairness > Diversity, Non-Discrimination and Fairness >
Stakeholder Participation.
Narrative Response
Clinical trials are rare in the field of AI and are certainly
welcomed. The design of the trial needs to be carefully
considered and thoroughly thought through in consideration
of stakeholder priorities, concerns, and active participation.
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ID Ethical Issue: E10, Unclear Tool
Definition and Safety Assessment
Description
It is unclear whether the tool is a medical device or not and
whether its safety was sufficiently assessed by the involved ethics
committees and authorities.
Map to Ethical Pillars/Requirements/
Sub-Requirements (Closed Vocabulary)
Prevention of Harm > Technical robustness and safety > General
safety.
Narrative Response
It is unclear whether the tool is a medical device or not. Thus, it is
also unclear whether the clinical studies should have fallen under
medical device regulation. It is thus also unclear whether the
Danish authorities and the involved ethics committees assessed
the safety of the tool sufficiently.
This is the list of the consolidated tensions.
TENSIONS
We define “true dilemma” as a tension between values that is
general to any AI system faced with the problem at hand. We
define “dilemma in practice” as a tension specific to the affordances
and features of this particular system.We define “false dilemma” as
an apparent tension between values that, in fact, could be readily
resolved through a canonical technical procedure that is known to
work in this domain (Whittlestone et al., 2019).
ID Ethical Tension (Open Vocabulary): ET1
Kind of tension: True Dilemma.
Trade-off: Autonomy vs. Accuracy.
Description: Autonomous AI system may or may not be more
accurate than with the interaction of a human dispatcher
(support system).
ID Ethical Tension (Open Vocabulary): ET2
Kind of tension: True dilemma.
Trade-off: Privacy vs. Accuracy.
Description: The more data, the better the AI system will likely
perform. However, there is a challenge to adequately protect and
maintain the privacy of the individuals.
ID Ethical Tension (Open Vocabulary): ET3
Kind of tension: Dilemma in practice.
Trade-off: Autonomy vs. Quality of Services.
Description: There is a question of who is the participant - the
dispatcher and/or caller/patient. If it is the caller/patient, their
autonomy should be respected and informed consent be obtained
according to best practices for emergency medicine.
ID Ethical Tension (Open Vocabulary): ET4
Kind of tension: True dilemma.
Trade-off: Fairness vs. Accuracy.
Description: The algorithm is accurate on average but may
systematically discriminate against specific minorities of callers
and/or dispatchers due to ethnic and gender bias in the
training data.
ID Ethical Tension (Open Vocabulary): ET5
Kind of tension: True dilemma.
Trade-off: Safety vs. Efficiency.
Description: There is a risk of incorrect diagnosis and
intervention arising from false positives, relative to that
provided by human dispatchers.
ID Ethical Tension (Open Vocabulary): ET6
Kind of tension: True dilemma.
Trade-off: Accuracy vs. Explainability.
Description: The tool lacks explainability but explainable AI
systems may be less accurate than non-interpretable models.
ID Ethical Tension (Open Vocabulary): ET7
Kind of tension: True dilemma.
Trade-off: Security vs. Accessibility.
Description: The system should be transparent and available
to various stakeholders, but also must have safeguards to resist
external threats that may limit transparency conditions.
ID Ethical Tension (Open Vocabulary): ET8
Kind of tension: True dilemma.
Trade-off: Utility vs. Economic Interests.
Description: AI systems should be effective and improve
medical interventions without unnecessary disruption (e.g.,
hospital workflow).
ID Ethical Tension (Open Vocabulary): ET9
Kind of tension: True dilemma.
Trade-off: Safety vs. Convenience.
Description: Clinical trials are rare in the AI field, but could
ensure that the devices are safe and effective. However, there is a
tension that clinical trials are time-consuming and costly and
cannot be provided by manufacturers to the necessary degree.
Challenges of Mapping the HLEG AI
Guidelines to this Specific Case
A challenge is related to making the abstract principles
formulated in the guidelines applicable to the respective case
study. This almost certainly will involve some narrowing down of
the broad concepts (such as autonomy or privacy) reflected in the
principles to conceptions that prove useful in the case study.
While from a pragmatic point of view, this seems adequate, both
for time constraints and in view of the interdisciplinary nature of
the group of researchers, it certainly limits the philosophical,
ethical, and legal bandwidth and depth of the discussion.
Despite the broad multidisciplinary expertize of our
Z-Inspection® assessment team, it was surprising how
challenging it was to map broad general guidelines to a
concrete and specific use case. This highlights that all
institutions tasked with assessing and regulating AI in
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healthcare products should exhibit two important characteristics:
On the one hand, flexibility in assessing the solution at hand. It is
likely that different solutions will have very different advantages
and challenges. Hardcoding certain requirements into regulation
is thus probably not a recommended way forward. On the other
hand, this requires broad and wide expertize in all areas related to
AI in healthcare.
THE RESOLVE PHASE: VERIFICATION OF
REQUIREMENTS
As a next step, we will work on task IV verification of
requirements of the Assess Phase. Here, the goal is to start
from the list of consolidated ethical and technical and legal
issues, to prioritize them by urgency, verify any claims, and as
a result of this verification, give feedback to the expert teams so
that they can possibly revise the final list of ethical issues and
tensions, and then produce some recommendations.
To verify claims, we plan to use a mixed approach, consisting
in adapting concepts from the Claims, Arguments, Evidence
(CAE) framework and using the ALTAI web tool. CAE is
often used as a framework in aviation, nuclear, and defense
industries to reason about safety, security, reliability, and
dependability. Recent work has begun applying CAE to the
safety analysis of AI systems (Brundage et al., 2020; Zhao
et al., 2020). We will adjust the concepts to apply to the seven
requirements for trustworthy AI.
The ALTAI web tool (AI HLEG, 2020) is an interactive general
self-assessment beta prototype tool based on the EU trustworthy
AI framework. The tool is not specific to the domain of
healthcare. It gives only general recommendations and
produces a generic score. We are already experienced in using
it. We will adapt the general recommendations resulting from the
tool and take into account the results of the verification phase, the
final list of ethical issues and tensions, and then produce specific
recommendations relevant for the domain of healthcare, and for
this case in particular.
The output of the assessment will be a report containing
recommendations to the key stakeholders. Such
recommendations should be considered a source of qualified
information that help decision makers make good decisions, and
that help the decision-making process for defining appropriate
trade-offs. They would also help continue the discussion by
engaging additional stakeholders in the decision-process.
We list here a preliminary list of recommendations for this
use case.
Recommendation 1: It is important to ensure that dispatchers
understand the model predictions so that they can identify errors
and detect biases that could discriminate against certain
populations. Here, the model is a statistical black-box, and the
clinical trial conducted with the model showed an important lack
of trust that had an impact on the outcome of the trial. An
improvement to the model would include interpretable local
approximations [such as SHAP (Lundberg and Lee, 2017)],
which are easy for stakeholders to understand and provide
different levels of interpretation for judging the relevance of an
individual prediction. In our example, explanation may involve
words that were more predictive, tone of voice, or breath sounds.
Recommendation 2: We believe that the team should either
intentionally sample the entire training set in order to prevent
discrimination, or define a heuristic that could inform dispatchers
when to use and when not to use the model. Feeding the ML
system with a data set that is built to more adequately represent
the whole population would avoid bias toward older males and
better take all genders, ages, and ethnicities into consideration
and would make the system work better with dialects and non-
native speakers. An approach like this would be in analogy to
what has been recommended for facial recognition technology
applications (Buolamwini and Gebru, 2018). Alternatively, the
use of the ML system could be confined to those cases that are
inside the training distribution, and in the other cases, signal a
disclaimer to the dispatchers. This would allow the dispatchers to
better identify the cases where to rely on their own decision-
making and prevent them from being overturned by the system
when the system lacks reliability. This approach would increase
dispatcher autonomy and could improve the overall outcome.
Recommendation 3: Involve stakeholders. The group of
(potential future) patients and (potential future) callers could
be interested in how the system functions and is developed. User
involvement/stakeholder involvement could be very helpful in
the process of re-designing the AI system.
Recommendation 4: It is important to learn how the protocol
(what questions, how many, etc.) does or does not influence the
accuracy of the ML output. Further research work should be
performed to answer this question. The goal should be to
responsibly integrate the classifier into the context of the
dispatcher calls rather than just have it passively observe the
call and make “trustworthy” recommendations. This requires
reimagining the context of the calls themselves (with new
protocols, questions, etc.).
Recommendation 5: Although we did not assess the legal
aspects of the AI system, we suggest to the prime stakeholder
to verify with legal local competent authorities if the AI system
needed a CE-certification as a medical device, according to the
definition of current regulation Medical Device Directives
(MDD), which was transposed into Danish Law. In the new
forthcoming Medical Device Regulation (MDR) in the EU, which
will apply from May 26, 2021, “software that is used for human
beings for the medical purpose of prediction or prognosis of
disease will be classified as a medical device.”Under theMDR, the
AI system will be classified as medical device, and it would




To put this into a broader context, one of the main problems
debated in ethics, in the field of human-machine interaction, is
the possible complete “replacement” of the human decision-
making capacity. This is recognition of the principle of human
dignity, in a human-centric approach, and the principle of non-
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maleficence (do no harm to humans) and beneficence (do good
to humans) in ethics. Human involvement in design and
construction is not enough to discharge this concern. Humans
need to maintain a level of control and oversight over the AI,
allowing it to cognitively assist human decisions, not become a
substitute for them. Machines should not compete but complete
human actions. The AI HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines
requirement for human agency and oversight tacitly
acknowledges this debate and seeks to ensure that AI is used
to inform decision making, not make the decisions.
The AI HLEG trustworthy AI guidelines specifically recognize
a “right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated
processing when this [...] significantly affects them” (AI HLEG,
2019, p. 16). In order to comply with this requirement, a certain
level of human involvement is necessary. As such, the first issue to
consider from a human agency and oversight perspective will be
what the appropriate level of human involvement is.
Different levels of human oversight in AI have been
categorized as human in the loop, human on the loop, or
human in command. Human in command describes a high
level of human involvement, with human in the loop and on
the loop incrementally less. To the extent a high level of human
involvement is deemed necessary from an ethical standpoint, this
will necessarily reduce some of the benefits the AI system was
intended to bring (Hickman and Petrin, 2020). On the other
hand, minimal human oversight raises concerns regarding
monitoring of the accuracy of the AI system and potential
harm and liability that could result. There is a trade-off
between the efficiency gains of the AI and the ability to
oversee its decisions. The appropriate balance for this trade-off
needs to be part of the assessment.
A second issue relating to human involvement is the impact of
the presence of AI in the process and its perception by the
humans charged with overseeing it (supervisors) and
processing its output (dispatchers). For both supervisors and
dispatchers, if there is a perception that the AI is not often wrong,
heuristics suggest that they will be less likely to spot the anomalies
when they arise. Conversely, the AI may frequently be wrong.
In the randomized clinical trial, less than one in five alerts were true
positives, raising the possibility of alert fatigue, which could result in
true alerts being ignored. These potential issues, and others like them,
will need to be identified and methods to resolve them will need to be
explored. Such resolutions could include, for example, (Blomberg et
al., 2021) a heuristic tool that informs the dispatcher when and when
not to rely on the system, for example, to put a disclaimer in place in
certain situations.
Relatedly, a relational conception of human dignity, which is
characterized by our social relations, requires that we should be
aware of whether and when we are interacting with a machine or
another human being and that we reserve the right to vest certain
tasks to the human or the machine. In this ethical framework, the
ethics of AI is the ethics of human beings: the machine cannot
obscure the agency, which is human. Humans conceive, design,
use AI, and humans should be kept at the center (human-centric
approach).
The need to keep human oversight also remains essential in
order to avoid the possible problem of technological delegation.
An AI system that becomes optimal in suggesting “decisions” to
humans (also in medicine, e.g., as in this case) poses the risk of
decreasing human attention with the possible consequence of
reducing human skills (the so-called phenomenon of de-skilling
or de- professionalization), reducing responsibility. In this sense,
it is important to frame a complementarity between man and
machine, searching for ways of intelligent “support” that allows
man to have “significant or meaningful human control”8 in terms
of attention, contribution, supervision, control, and
responsibility.
Legal Perspective
The general debate on AI in healthcare has identified a great
variety of legal issues concerning, inter alia, intellectual property
(IP), privacy and data protection (Ford and Price, 2016), product
safety and cybersecurity (Tschider, 2018), liability risks due to
negligence claims (Kerr et al., 2017; Price et al., 2021, 2019), and,
more specifically, the applicability of medical device regulation
(Gerke, Minssen, et al., 2020; Kiseleva, 2019). On a more general
level, even tax, trade, and non-discrimination laws need to be
observed (Puaschunder, 2019). The assessment of trustworthy AI
cannot take all these manifold legal implications into account,
and it therefore cannot replace a proper legal, due diligence
review. However, it can and does provide a plausibility check
with a focus on the most specific legal challenges. (See section on
Possible Accountability Issues).
AI system (for an overview, see for example European
Commission. Directorate General for Justice and Consumers
(2019)). Such liability can be both civil and criminal in nature.
Generally, regarding civil liability, this could be based on contractual
and non-contractual theories, with the latter including general tort
law and – if, which is not certain, an AI system is or will be classified
as a product in the legal sense – product liability principles. The latter
are governed both by harmonized EU principles and national/
domestic law, that is in the present use case, presumably mainly
Danish law. In the future, there will likely be new laws specifically
geared towards liability for AI. Indeed, the European Parliament has
recently drafted a resolution with recommendations to the
Commission concerning civil liability relating to an liability for
AI (European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with
recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime
for artificial intelligence (2020/2014(INL)).
In terms of relevant parties, individuals and/or legal entities
involved in designing, developing, importing, distributing, selling,
and using AI, among other roles, are potentially exposed. Indeed,
we could even imagine that not using AI may – if not now, then at
least in the future – lead to liability (Price et al., 2019). More
specifically, for the present use case, parties that are potentially
exposed to liability include (in addition to the parties mentioned
above) the hospital, dispatchers, and staff. Further, it is even
possible to imagine scenarios where the person who called the
8The principle of Meaningful Human Control was first suggested in the field of
weapon systems. This means that humans - and not computers and their
algorithms - should ultimately remain in control, and thus be morally
responsible. But now, it is also used with reference to human oversight.
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emergency number or other bystanders might face liability for
incorrectly or unnecessarily attempting resuscitation of
patients. It is important to note that liability issues, as well as
any other legal issues relevant to AI and its specific use cases,
tend to be jurisdiction-specific, that is governed by local laws in
the relevant country or countries to which there are pertinent
connections (such as the AI is being used there, has caused
harm, etc.). As mentioned above, it is therefore critical for those
involved in the use case discussed herein to ensure that an in-
depth legal analysis by lawyers qualified to advise on legal
matters in the relevant jurisdiction(s) and with specialist
knowledge in the various subject areas is conducted, and that
any insights therefrom will be considered when implementing
the AI system.
The previous discussion assumes that the AI system in this use
case has met all legal requirements for introducing it to the
market. Whether that is the case is governed by another set of
specific rules. For this case, we assume that the Danish legal
framework applies. It is based on the EU Commission’s guidance
MEDDEV 2.1/6 2012 - Qualification and Classification of stand
alone software9 and the Danish executive order from 15/12/2008
about medical devices10 .
The Danish executive order implements the EU Council
‘Medical Device Directive 93/42/EEC’ into Danish law. The
responsible authority is the Danish Medicines Agency
(DKMA) under the Danish Health Authority. According to
DKMA, no requirements in the Danish Executive order go
beyond what is stated in the EU directive11.
The Danish executive order defines a medical device as
“any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or
other article, whether used alone or in combination, including
the software intended by its manufacturer to be used
specifically for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and
necessary for its proper application, intended by the
manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose
of: a) diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or
alleviation of disease (...)”12.
Importantly, as stated, whether a device is within the definition
of the executive order depends on the intended purpose of the
device, which is defined by the manufacturer. If so, the device
“must fulfill the requirements in the applicable legislation and
classified according to risk and CE marked”13. Some of these
requirements are: a process for the development and design of
safe products; clinical evaluation; risk analysis; labeling and
information about the manufacturer; instructions in Danish;
and an established market surveillance system.
Limitations
Among the various audit frameworks, ethics as a service
approaches or impact assessment tools for AI systems, every
one of them has its limitations and shortcomings. With
Z-Inspection®, it is no different. Although the method has
several great strengths (Zicari et al., 2021), among them the
lack of conflicting interests on the side of the members, the
interdisciplinary approach, the broad scope of the framework etc.,
it also has an important limitation:
The evaluation cannot guarantee that the organization
administering the AI system in question necessarily sticks to
the recommendations that are given. However, since
participation in the inspection is voluntary, organizations
come with a high openness for proposed changes.
A requirement for AI systems that is becomingmore andmore
salient is that their computing power should be also estimated
(Strubell et al., 2019). If we consider specifically this use case,
during the assessment we had no access to information on the
energy requirements during model training, and therefore we
cannot give recommendations in this respect.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The best practice defined in this paper illustrates that our holistic
and multidisciplinary evaluation process can be used to evaluate
the risks and identify the ethical tensions arising from the use of
the AI system and can also be used to improve current or future
versions of an AI system.
AI systems can raise ethical and societal concerns from
direct stakeholders, such as patients in healthcare, and from
indirect stakeholders such as politicians or general media.
The nature of these concerns can vary and include a vast
array of topics like data security, biases, cost-benefit-debates,
technical dependencies, or technical supremacy. The
interdisciplinary approach of the evaluation can help to
identify these concerns in many different fields, already at very
early development stages.
Evaluation of AI development with a holistic approach like
Z-Inspection® creates benefits related to general acceptance or
concerns inside and outside the institution that applies an AI
project. The approach can improve the quality of the project’s
processes and increase transparency about possible conflicts of
interest. In general, the system becomes more comprehensible,
which improves the quality of communication for any kind of
stakeholder.
For the public, communicating the evaluation process itself
can help reinforce trust in such a system by making its exact
workings transparent, even to non-specialist project staff. This
transparency helps funders, oversight boards, and executive
teams explain their decisions about funding and governing
decisions as well as the system’s operation.
An important lesson from this use case is that there should be
some requirement that independent experts can assess the system
before its deployment. This seems to be relevant in order to
determine its trustworthiness in the first place as a means toward
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One way to understand this use case we have been looking
at is to see the “medical discussions” as possible forms of
validation metrics rather than simply mechanisms for
“verifiable claims,” as OpenAI has recently argued
(Brundage et al., 2020).
Instead of formal verification procedures concerned with
matching the model to the proposed specification, empirical
validation would investigate whether the specification itself is
well-founded, treating the model parameters as “hypotheses” that
must be tested against real-world conditions under controlled
settings (Dobbe et al., 2019).
So the question for our inspection isn’t just making AI systems
that are trustworthy, but making sure the proposed
trustworthiness definition actually matches the expectations of
affected parties, and drawing attention to the way particular use
cases highlight discrepancies within and across stakeholder
groups and point to a need for further validation and
regulation through clinical standards.
While this use case directly refers to the use of machine
learning as a supportive tool to recognize cardiac arrest in
emergency calls, there are various ways in which the findings of
this qualitative analysis could be applicable to other contexts. First, the
general framework for achieving trustworthy AI set out in the HLEG
AI guidelines proved to be an adequate starting point for a specific case
study discussion in the healthcare domain. Second, the ethical
principles of the HLEG AI guidelines need some context-specific
specification. Third, this contextualization and specification can
successfully be undertaken by an interdisciplinary group of
researchers that together are able to not only bring in the relevant
scientific, medical and technological expertize but also to highlight the
various facets of the ethical principles as they play out in the
respective case.
The Peril of Inaccurate Inspection
There is a danger that a false or inaccurate inspection will create
natural skepticism by the recipient, or even harm them and,
eventually, backfire on the inspectionmethod. There are also legal
issues (some of which are addressed in the Human-Machine
interaction and Legal perspective Section). This is a well-known
problem for all quality processes. We alleviated it using an open
development and incremental improvement to establish a process
and brand (“Z-Inspected”).
IN MEMORIAM
Our team member, colleague and friend Naveed Mushtaq has
passed away on December 27, 2020, after suffering a sudden
cardiac arrest a few weeks before. This work is dedicated
to him.
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